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that determinism does not account for all phenomena in our life, and consequently it is unnecessary to have a very long discussion upon all those arguments familiar to philosophers; why insist so haughtily upon the influence of the idea of liberty, conscience of liberty, duty? etc. Even the step from moral obligation to the idea of God (which is here, I must say, clearer and brighter formulated than anywhere else, as far as I know) is not new to anybody. And still the same as for a possibility of liberty on account of the free choice between two determined possibilities, this theory exposed not only by Prof. James, whom the author quotes, but by quite a number of philosophers centuries ago.

Another point is that Mr. Fulliquet has no right to say that any philosopher has ever refused to admit the existence of moral obligation; some only refused to admit that the origin of this obligation has to be looked for in a transcendental world, or simply outside of the world, and of the chain of causes and effects—that is quite different.

Finally: Mr. Fulliquet distinguishes two kinds of obligations: (1) the moral obligation, and (2) the obligations by egotism, by intelligence, by association, by the ideal, and so forth,—and he concludes therefrom: the obligations of the second kind being not liable to be conceived in the same way as moral obligation, they are not really obligations at all. Now, would it not be possible, and for reasons just as good, if not better, to say: If moral obligation in the sense of Mr. Fulliquet is not liable to be conceived like the other obligations *for which we have a rational explanation*, it is not really an obligation in the sense we can give to this word in the ordinary—the rational—way of speaking.

As for the substitution of an “unconscious ego” as the creator of free acts, in the place of an “intelligible ego” with Kant, it seems to me rather a difference of words than of notion.

It is of no special interest to speak here of the history of ethics, that is, the exposition of some systems of ethics in this century (Kant, Schopenhauer, Mr. Renouvier, H. Spencer, Ch. Secrétan, Mr. Fouillée, Guyau). This part of the book also offers nothing new: there have been very able publications of this kind before the one by Mr. Fulliquet.

I wish to say, in closing, that most of the above criticism applies not only to Mr. Fulliquet's book, but to all those—so numerous today—which take up well-known problems in an antiquated way.

A. SCHINZ, PH. D.

(72) *Essai sur les conditions et les limites de la certitude logique.*

By G. MILHAUD. 2^e édition revue. Alcan, Paris, 1898.

The author belongs to the class of thinkers who are gradually taking the place of the French “Spiritualistes” followers of Cousin. Their most important representative is Mr. Boutroux. The book, “De la certitude logique,” belongs to the same category as “De la contingence des lois de la nature,” by Boutroux, and the “*Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience*,” by Bergson. All of them agree with modern science and its methods; even the neo-Kantian school of Renouvier does not satisfy their wants of exactitude. On the other hand, however, they try to escape from the results of the new science, and they elaborate their theories on the basis of the science of Logic.

The most evident principle of science is the principle of contradiction; and it is this very first principle, the consequence of which Mr. Milhaud attacks sharply, as soon as these consequences are applied outside a certain field of speculation. He distinguishes

between the *objective* knowledge, which is given to us, and the *subjective* knowledge, which is *constructed by us*. Science is based entirely upon subjective knowledge: we accept definitions, and on this ground we build up science; but all our definitions are conventional, relative. We admit them as a result based upon a certain amount of facts, but we never know whether there are no other facts which perhaps might not correspond to the definition; and as we never know whether we have cognizance of all possible facts connected with an absolute definition, the result is that "no lurid mind will ever have the right to declare a hypothesis as definitive" ("Jamais un esprit éclairé n'aura le droit de déclarer une hypothèse définitive.") He attacks the positivist method on its own ground. He takes advantage of the concessions of Stuart Mill, in his "Philosophy of Hamilton," but pushes the theory to the very end. Not only must Mill be able to recognize that something entirely black may at the same time be white, and that a round object may perhaps be square, and that 2×2 are possibly 5, but in order to remain consistent, Mill has no right to hesitate in admitting that *A* may at the same time be *non A*.—Consequently, and that is the object of the whole demonstration, we can never condemn any theory on account of its relation with some other theory. Since we are the authors ourselves of our science, we have constructed it with elements invented by ourselves; and it may be perfectly possible that our science is wrong.

Mr. M. verifies his theory on mathematics, and applies it to moral liberty, the non-Euclidian geometry, and the solution of the antimonies of Kant by Mr. Renouvier.

I do not agree with the author in the conclusions he arrives at. If the theoretical scepticism he asserts has to be applied also in practical life—and it is the very reason for the theory, to save in that way moral liberty—I hardly see how science would be of any use to us. And yet if we may judge according to the past of science, there is no reason to doubt the practical value of the experimental and positive methods—no matter what the psychological origin of the method may be. However, it is a very interesting book, and one may derive great benefit in reading it.

A. SCHINZ, PH. D.

(73) *L'individualité et l'erreur individualiste*. FÉLIX LE DANTEC. Alcan, Paris, 1898, pp. 175.

Within a few months this is the third book published by this author. It is not very surprising, therefore, that he takes up the largely the same topics not only in every book, but in the different chapters of each volume. We cannot expect from a scientist that he should collect each month matter enough to fill a new book. . . . Mr. Le Dantec is a fighter, and since his physiologico-deterministic ideas were attacked sharply, he thinks it necessary to defend himself again. It seems to me that there was no reason for being surprised when, for instance, Catholic reviewers of his earlier books expressed views different from his own. Mr. Le Dantec is like so many writers of to-day who fail to recognize that the public consists of two classes of people: the scholars and the readers untrained in philosophy. I am sure that among the first class nobody would disagree with Mr. Le Dantec in his deterministic views; and if some do, it is only for reasons of sentiment, as the author says himself; they do not introduce the liberty, that is, the belief in an interruption of the strictly necessary sequence of causes and effects, within their scientific deductions. Whatever their conviction may be as to the existence of moral liberty, their